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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates a new explanation for the international equity home bias puzzle based on 
an endogenous asymmetric information model. Using a cross-sectional mutual fund data set, it is 
found that the degrees of home bias across fund managers are negatively correlated to the asset 
sizes under their management. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction in the 
endogenous asymmetric information model--the portfolio managers with the larger assets tend to 
acquire more information regarding foreign equity and, hence, hold more foreign equity 
holdings. 
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1. Introduction 
Equity home bias, the observation that individuals hold too little of their fund size in 
foreign assets, is one of the major puzzles in international finance. The standard capital asset 
pricing model suggests that investors should diversify their fund size across countries, yet the 
observed data indicate that investors seem to largely forgo this gain to diversification. Previous 
literatures have demonstrated theoretically the sizeable advantage of international diversification 
(Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Solnik, 1974). In particular, simulations in Lewis (1999) predict that 
American investors’ portfolios should have at least 40 percent in foreign assets. However, the 
actual proportion of foreign assets held by American investors is only about 10 percent (French 
and Poterba, 1991; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Ahearne, Griever and 
Warnock, 2004).  
In an effort to understand how asymmetric information leads to international equity home 
bias,  Gehrig (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1997) show that the investors will have more home 
equity holdings if the investors are assumed to have a static information advantage over foreign 
investors about domestic markets. 1  Kang and Stulz (1997) present some indirect evidence that 
foreign investors primarily invest in stocks of Japanese companies that are more familiar to 
them, even when the expected returns are lower than the returns on other Japanese stocks. Portes, 
Rey and Oh (2001) use the volume of telephone calls as a proxy for information costs and finds 
positive contribution to the gross flow of equity transactions.  The countries with a greater share 
of firms that have public U.S. listings (which mitigates information costs) tend to be less 
severely underweighted in U.S. equity portfolios (Ahearne et al., 2004; Edison and Warnock, 
2004; Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki, 2005, for US mutual funds; Chan, Covrig and Ng, 2005, 
for 26 countries). 2   Ferreira and Miguel (2007) use industry concentration as a proxy for 
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information and find a positive correlation between industry concentration and the domestic and 
foreign equity biases. Lütje and Menkhoff (2007) use mutual fund survey data from a German 
questionnaire and find that informational and behavioral determinants of home bias hold 
simultaneously.3 These papers establish the important role that asymmetric information can play 
in explaining the home bias puzzle. 
Different from earlier theoretical work on home bias, Barron and Ni (2006) present a home-
bias model that relies on asymmetric information and explain differences in the extent of home 
bias across portfolio managers.  Their rational expectation model includes an information 
acquisition process in which heterogeneous domestic portfolio managers (in terms of portfolio 
size) decide whether to acquire costly information on foreign assets.  The analysis adds to 
Gehrig's (1993) finding that informed portfolio managers have higher demands for foreign assets 
by linking the acquisition of information by portfolio managers in each country directly to their 
portfolio size.  The simulations based on the model illustrate the effect of asymmetric 
information on the home bias. First, the simulation shows that portfolio managers with larger 
initial assets will have a higher proportion of assets in foreign securities (less equity home bias). 
Second, fewer portfolio managers are informed when the information cost increases, and thus the 
home bias is more pronounced. This provides explanation to size effects on home bias found in 
recent research (Karlsson and Norden, 2007; Graham, Harvey and Huang, 2005).4  
The objective of this paper is to shed additional light on the role of asymmetric 
information on equity home bias based on Barron and Ni’s model.  Following Barron and Ni 
(2006), we focus on the institutional investors who have relatively more information (Bushee and 
Goodman, 2007; Lütje and Menkhoef, 2007) and investigate the different degrees of home bias 
across them.  Using cross-sectional mutual fund data, we indicate that the home bias exists even 
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for this relatively informed group. However, the degree of the home bias is less than the 
observed national aggregate level. Most importantly, the regression results show that foreign 
asset holdings are positively and significantly associated with the portfolio sizes of the managers, 
which is consistent with the theoretical model. This conclusion is robust among the subgroups 
(whole sample, single manager group, domestic equity fund group, and domestic equity funds 
with a single manager) after controlling the other variables such as fund concentration, manager 
tenures, total number of holdings, fund categories and objectives, number of funds, expense 
ratios, dummies for team management and dummies for close-ended funds.    
This paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly introduces the endogenous 
asymmetric information theory and sets up the hypothesis. Section 3 discusses the data source 
and regression analysis. Conclusions follow in the final section.  
 
2. The Theory and Hypothesis 
Following Barron and Ni (2006), we assume two symmetric markets: the home market A 
and the foreign market B. Each market has a large number of portfolio managers (including fund 
managers and individual investors) so that each investor has an infinitesimal effect on the 
market. The portfolio managers are uniformly distributed over the range [0, 1] according to the 
levels of their initial portfolio size 0W , i.e. 0 0( ) 1,  [0,1]f W W=   
 To each portfolio manager, there are three available assets in the market: a risky asset 
with return 
AR  issued by the home market, a risky asset with return BR  issued by the foreign 
market, and a risk-free asset with return r: 
 
, ,j j jR j A B = + =  
(1) 
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where the random variable j  has a normal distribution with mean j  and variance j ,    the 
error term j  is an i.i.d. variable and has normal distribution with mean 0  and variance 
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j , and 
jointly, j  and j  have a multivariate normal distribution with ( ) 0j jE   =  and 
2( | )j j jVar R  = . j  is observable to all portfolio managers in their own country j  at no cost, 
and is observable to the informed portfolio managers in the other country at a cost of c . To keep 
things concise, we also assume that the observed returns of the risky assets are uncorrelated.  
Each portfolio manager makes two sequential decisions: strategic information acquisition 
and investment. All portfolio managers are assumed to have information about the home market 
at zero cost. On the other hand, they need to decide whether to acquire information by paying a 
cost  or to remain uninformed about the foreign market. In order to focus on the information 
acquisition decision, we further assume in the model that there are no barriers to investment 
other than the cost of information, no currency and political risk, no deviations from purchasing 
power parity, and no interest rate differentials on average. 
The decision to acquire information on foreign assets is based on a comparison of the 
expected utility when informed and the expected utility when uninformed. The maximization of 
expected utility for portfolio managers in each country is now characterized in detail.  Bagnoli 
and Watts (2000) indicate that for funds that had more than 50% of their assets invested in stocks 
in 1995, a majority set the future compensation of their managers equal to a constant percentage 
of the future value of the managed assets.5   It is assumed that as the initial portfolio size oW  
increases, the proportion of the future value of the portfolio that is paid as compensation to one 
of the managers of the fund decreases.  That is, let t denote the proportion of the fund's future 
value paid as compensation to one of its fund managers, it is assumed that '( ) 0ot W < . 
c
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A simple expression can be obtained for the proportion of the fund's future value paid as 
compensation to each manager as follows.  Assuming that there are constant returns to scale in 
portfolio management, then the ratio of the total number of portfolio managers to total initial 
portfolio size, denoted by n, is a positive constant, and the total number of portfolio managers at 
a fund with initial portfolio size oW  equals onW .  Further, assume the total future compensation 
across all managers of a fund is a constant proportion v  of the total future value of the fund.  
Then, the future compensation to one of these fund managers, 1
kjtW , equals ( )0 1/ ( )
kjv nW W , 
such that '( ) 0ot W < . 
Assuming an exponential utility function for compensation, a representative portfolio 
manager (one of onW  managers) of type k  ( ,k I U= ) with initial total asset value oW  in 
country j  ( ,j A B= ) anticipates utility 1( )
kjV W  in the form: 
 
1 1
( ) exp( )kj kjV W aW= − −  (2) 
where = 0' / ( )a a v nW  and 'a  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of a portfolio 
manager, which is assumed to be the same across portfolio managers.  Without loss of generality,  
Barron and Ni (2006) show that the units of portfolio size are set such that ' / 1a v n =  and thus 
1/ oa W= .
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It is further assumed that portfolio managers have access to a risk-free asset available in 
limitless supply. Then portfolio manager of type k  who lives in country l  will have a future 
fund size equal to 1 0( ) ( ) ( )
kl kl kl
A A A B B BW W c r X R rP X R rP= − + − + − , where 
kl
jX  is the demand 
for country j ’s ( ,j A B= ) risky asset by individual of type k  ( ,k I U= ) who lives in country l  
( ,l A B= ).  is a function that equals 0 if the portfolio manager is uninformed ( k U= ) and 1 if 
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the portfolio manager is informed ( k I= ), jP  is the price of country j ’s risky asset, and c  is the 
total information cost. Note that the price of the risk-free asset is normalized to 1.  
 The information acquisition decision leads to two types of portfolio managers in each 
market: the informed portfolio managers (I) with information on their home and foreign markets, 
and the uninformed portfolio managers (U) with home market information only. Barron and Ni 
(2006) proved that there exists a cutoff portfolio size level, W , such that portfolio managers with 
larger initial asset size than the cutoff asset size become informed, and the portfolio managers 
with less initial asset size than the cutoff asset size remain uninformed. Given the distribution of 
portfolio managers 0( )f W , note that a higher cutoff W implies that the proportion of informed 
portfolio managers is lower. 
Both informed and uninformed portfolio managers make decisions about the demand for 
assets. In particular, the maximization of expected utility yields the following demands by 
informed portfolio managers ( k I= ) in either country: 
 
2 2
Il IlA A B B
A B
A B
rP rP
X X
a a
 
 
− −
=  =    
0
1
, ;   l A B a
W
= = . (3) 
Similarly, the demands for uninformed portfolio managers (k=U) in country A are 
 
2
0
( | ) 1
       
( | )
UA UAA A B B B B
A B
A B B B
rP E R P P rP
X X a
Wa a Var R P P




− = −
=  =  =
=
. (4) 
and for uninformed portfolio managers in country B, the demand functions for the two assets are 
 
2
0
( | ) 1
  
( | )
UB UBA A A A B B
A B
A A A B
E R P P rP rP
X X a
WaVar R P P a




= − −
=  =  =
=
 (5) 
where ( | )j jE R P

 denotes the expected return on asset j for an uninformed portfolio manager 
living in country l j  based on the observed price. 
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 The demand of informed portfolio managers depends on the revealed information on 
asset returns and the asset prices. The demand of uninformed portfolio managers depends on the 
asset prices only. The larger the portfolios are, the larger are the risky asset investment. For the 
case where the portfolio is determined by a set of managers, the above demands represent the 
consensus among these managers with respect to the optimal fund portfolio.7  This consensus has 
a scaling property that the managers' view of the optimal proportion of the fund's portfolio 
allocated to risky-assets (domestic and foreign) is invariant to portfolio size. However, each fund 
manager's loss in compensation from the acquisition of information on foreign assets is less 
because information costs are shared across a number of fund managers.  The resulting lower 
average information cost per fund manager (economies of scale) means that the management 
teams are more likely to acquire the costly information on foreign assets (become informed).   
 Under the assumption of rational expectation, prices have a certain relationship with the 
underlying asset return and supply, such that at equilibrium the prices clear the international 
capital market by equating total asset supply to total asset demand. 
  i.e.:
1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 00 0 0
1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 00 0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ;( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ;( )
W W
UA IA UBIB
A A A AAW W
W W
UA IA UBIB
B B B BBW W
X f W dW X f W dW X f W dW x f W dWX f W dW
X f W dW X f W dW X f W dW x f W dWX f W dW
+ + + =
+ + + =
    
    
   
where Ax  and Bx  are per capita supply of the risky asset A and B with mean ,  A Bx x  and 
variance ,  A B  , respectively. Note the density function 0 0( ) 1,  [0,1]f W W=   . 
With the above setup, it is shown that, holding other things constant, the gain to 
becoming informed is an increasing function of the initial asset size and a decreasing function of 
the cost of information.8 Given the uniform distribution of the portfolio managers in terms of 
portfolio size, this result means that information cost ratios are monotonically decreasing over 
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the range [0, 1]. There exists a cutoff information ratio, c W , such that each portfolio manager 
purchases information if and only if 0c W c W   .  
Hypothesis 1: The fund managers with larger portfolios will be more likely to become 
informed.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that those managers with larger assets will acquire information 
concerning foreign assets; those portfolio managers with asset size 0W W  become informed 
and the other portfolio managers remain uninformed.  
Now the information content is connected to home bias by comparing various demands in 
equilibrium. Under the assumption of symmetric countries, the informed portfolio managers 
have the same expected demand for domestic assets as the expected demands for foreign assets, 
i.e., ( ) ( )IA IAA BE X E X=  and ( ) ( )
IB IB
B AE X E X= . There is no home bias. The home bias arises due 
to the existence of the uninformed portfolio managers in each country. The expected demand for 
the foreign asset by an uninformed portfolio manager is less than his expected demand for the 
home asset. The latter is less than the expected demand for risky assets (foreign or domestic) of 
informed portfolio managers. That is, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )UA UA IA IAB A A BE X E X E X E X  = , where the strict 
inequality holds if and only if the information cost is positive ( 0c  ). 
Intuitively, there are two factors that lead to the above results. First, the uninformed 
foreign portfolio managers can only infer partial market information through the asset prices, 
which obviously results in a large potential risk hindering their investments. Second, the 
uninformed portfolio managers have smaller assets and thus have less risky asset holdings than 
informed portfolio managers (see demand function (4) – (5)).  
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If we consider the ratio of portfolios in foreign assets for both types of portfolio 
managers, the ratio of portfolios in foreign assets of the uninformed portfolio managers is lower 
than that of the informed portfolio managers. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The informed portfolio managers will have less home bias.  
The two hypotheses predict a different degree of home bias across portfolio managers. 
Hypothesis 1 presumes that the portfolio managers with a lower information cost ratio (larger 
asset under management given the fixed information cost) will be informed.  Hypothesis 2 
further induces that these informed portfolio managers will have more foreign equity holdings. 
Thus we anticipate that portfolio managers with larger investment size will be less home biased. 
In summary, the model provides testable hypotheses regarding the extent of home bias 
across portfolio managers. Namely, we anticipate that portfolio managers with a relatively low 
information cost ratio will be less home biased.  This suggests a comparison of the degree of 
home bias across portfolio managers relative to their total assets under management. 
Corresponding empirical work is done in the next section.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Analysis  
This section turns to some empirical tests of the major implications of the model. The 
theoretical model implies that informed portfolio managers are less home biased.  We test the 
hypothesis in the data regression by using the funds allocated to each of the portfolio managers 
as a proxy for information asymmetries, controlling many other factors.  
3.1. Data and Variable Statistics  
The cross-sectional mutual fund equity data are obtained from Morningstar’s Mutual 
Funds CD ROM for the year 2005.  The dataset contains 12,159 equity funds with 10,131 
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domestic equity funds and 2,028 international equity funds. The international equity funds 
include Europe, Japan, International Hybrid, Latin America, Diversified Pacific, Pacific 
excluding Japan, Specialty Precious Metals, Diversified Emerging Markets, World Stock, and 
Foreign Stock.  For the regression analysis, we first focus on the whole sample since the 
portfolio manager may diversify through the international equity funds, and then focused on 
domestic funds only to consider a more homogeneous fund group.  
From the CD,  total net assets under management, expense ratios, front load fees, and 
back load fees, total number of different holdings of a fund, manager names, manager tenures, 
and the composition of the asset as a percentage of total net asset were obtained, which included 
the percentage of fund assets in Domestic Equity, Foreign Equity, Bonds, Cash, and Others. 
There is another composition reported as percent of funds assets in developed countries and 
emerging countries. Table 1 summarizes the above variables. 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
As shown in Table 1, the majority of the portfolio is domestic equity (72.57%) and the 
average foreign holdings of the equity mutual funds are 19.51%.  In an unreported summarized 
table for the domestic equity funds only, the average foreign asset holdings are only 6.34% 
(86.51% at domestic asset, 4.51% at bonds and 2.64% at cash). This is consistent with Chan et al. 
(2005) that mutual funds, in aggregate, allocate a disproportionately larger fraction of investment 
to domestic stocks.  However, compared with the average American foreign asset holdings of 
about ten percent (Lewis, 1999; French and Poterba, 1991; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Tesar 
and Werner, 1995; Ahearne et al., 2004), the US mutual funds, as institutional investors, have 
less home bias.  
In line with the theoretical model, the assets allocated to each of the portfolio managers 
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are used as a proxy of information acquisition. The names of managers who are directly 
responsible for managing the fund’s portfolio are taken directly from the fund's prospectus. 
Other terms that appear in this column include “Multiple Managers” and “Management Team”. 
The “multiple managers” appears when more than two persons are involved in the fund 
management and they manage independently. The management team is used when there are 
more than two persons involved in fund management and they manage together, or when the 
fund strongly promotes its team-managed aspect.  In the data, there are 4,485 cases of individual 
managers, 5,202 cases of multiple managers and 2,472 cases of management teams. A dummy 
variable, GroupDummy, is generated to be 0 if it is an individual manager, 1 if it is a 
management team, and 2 if it is multiple managers.   
For each manager (or multiple managers or management team), the assets are aggregated 
into total Assets by the manager name. Similarly, we created a total number of holdings in 
average for manager i as iTtlhold and total number of funds for manager i as iNumFunds . To 
characterize the transaction cost effect on the foreign asset holdings, expense ratio, front load and 
back load fees are summed into a total cost and iExp  is used to measure the mean expense for 
manager i. The variable Tenure measures the years that a manager has been in charge of the 
funds, which measures how experience a manager is. In addition, CatDummies  is used to control 
for different fund categories and fund objectives. Finally, a dummy variable Closeend is set to be 
1 if the fund is a closed-end fund, 0 if it is an open-end fund.  
Two measurements of concentration are defined based on the stock class allocation and 
the regional allocation.  The Herfindal Index was adopted to measure the concentration of the 
funds (see similar applications at Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng, 2005; Ferreira and Miguel, 
13 
2007), which is defined as 2
1
N
n
n
HI w
=
= . 
The first measurement, ( 1HI ),  is the regional concentration where ( 1,2)nw n =  are the 
weights of the total assets allocated to developed markets and emerging markets, respectively. 
The second measurement, ( 2HI ), is a measure of portfolio concentration where ( 1,2,3,4)nw n =  
are the weights of domestic, foreign, bonds and others, respectively. The smaller the Herfindal 
Index, the more diversified across regions or across asset categories. The summarized statistics 
are listed in Table 1. As can be seen, the percentage of assets in developed countries is more than 
97 percent and the corresponding concentration index 1HI  is close to 1, which implies that the 
assets are more concentrated in developed countries. 2HI  is 0.84, together with the fact that 
domestic assets are 73 percent, which implies that the assets are more concentrated in domestic 
assets.  
3.2. Regression Model and Analysis  
Following the above variable definition, the regression model can be written as:  
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8
i i i i i
i i i i i
ForeignEquity a Asset a Exp a Ttlhold a Tenure
a NumFunds a GroupDummy a HI a CatDummies a Closeend 
= + + + +
+ + + + + .
 
The dependent variable, ForeignEquity , is the share of the foreign equity holdings for 
manager i . Two measures are used in the regression. First, the percentage of foreign asset for 
each manager at each fund is used. Then, the average percentage of foreign assets for each 
manager across all the funds under his name is used.  iAsset  is the log of size of the assets 
allocated to manager i , which is the aggregated funds’ Net Asset Value allocated to the same 
manager. From the hypothesis, it is expected that 0a  will be positive. The variable iExp measures 
the average expense for the manager i . The expense could be part of transaction costs or the 
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expenses to acquire information. The expected sign will be ambiguous. On one hand, according 
to transaction cost explain (see Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994), the higher the transaction cost, the 
lower the foreign equity holdings. On the other hand, the higher the information acquisition 
expenditure, the higher the foreign equity holdings. Variable iTenure  measures how many years 
the fund manager(s) has been in charge of the fund. The longer the tenure, the more experienced 
the manager. As Karlsson and Norden (2007) suggests, it is expected that the coefficient will be 
positive. For the dummy variable, iGroupDummy , it is expected  that, compared with the 
individual managers, the shares of foreign assets for both the management team and multiple 
managers are higher.   
The model controls other variables that measure the diversification. iTtlhold  is log of the 
average number of different holdings of a fund for manager i . This figure is meant to be a 
measure of portfolio risk. Specifically, the lower the figure, the more concentrated the fund is in 
a few companies or issues, and the more the fund is susceptible to the market fluctuations in 
these few holdings.  It would be expected that the coefficients would be negative as the more 
diversified portfolios across the companies may need less international diversification. 
iNumFunds  is the log of the average number of funds under managed by fund manager i . 
Based on the same reason as iTtlhold , it is expected that the coefficient for iNumFunds  would 
be negative. iHI  measures the concentration across the asset class -- the smaller the Herfindal 
Index, the more diversified across regions or across asset categories. As previously analyzed, the 
fact that two measurements of iHI  
(HI1 and HI2) are close to 1 indicates that the portfolio 
managers are concentrated in developed countries (including the US) and in domestic funds.  
Therefore, it is expected that the coefficients for them would be negative as they know less about 
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foreign assets, implied by Kacperczyk et al. (2005).   
Cross-sectional OLS regressions are performed at the manager level. Table 2 estimates 
the regression model with the whole sample. All regressions are controlled for the fund category 
and objective dummies. The overall fitness for the model is good as the adjusted R-square is 
about 90 percent. The dependent variable in the first two columns is the percentage of the foreign 
asset holdings for each manager at each fund. The last two columns use the average percentage 
of foreign assets for each manager across all the funds under his/her management. For all the 
cases, the coefficients for the asset size of the portfolio managers are positive and statistically 
significant at a one percent level. The results indicate that the proportion of foreign equity 
holdings will increase with the asset size allocated to the portfolio manager. Therefore, the 
portfolio will be less home biased when the fund managers manage a larger size of the assets. 
This is consistent with the model prediction -- the larger the investment, the less expensive the 
information cost per investment. The portfolio managers will acquire more information about 
foreign markets and hold more foreign assets.  
(Table 2 about here) 
 
The results for the iGroupDummy  
indicate that the management team significantly holds 
more foreign equity shares than the individual, while the multiple managers  hold less foreign 
equity shares with a significance level of 10% for the first two columns and 5% for the last two 
columns. This is consistent with the model discussion that the management team is more likely 
to acquire information because the information cost is divided among several managers. We 
expected to see larger shares of foreign assets for multiple managers than those of the individual 
manager. However, Morningstar defined the multiple managers as “more than two persons are 
involved in the fund management, and they manage independently. Where this term is used, 
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quite often the fund has divided net assets in set amounts among the individual managers”.9 
Therefore, multiple managers are seen to hold less foreign equity shares since they divided the 
total assets. Interestingly, Baer, Kempf and Ruenzi (2005) find that funds managed by team 
exhibit significantly lower risk than single manager funds and more persistent in their 
performance over time. This is related to our findings that management teams have more 
diversified portfolios.  
The estimates of other variables being proxy for information not attributed to sizes 
explain part of the foreign equity holdings. The coefficients for the expenses (Exp) are not 
significant which indicate the ambiguous effect discussed earlier. That is, the transaction cost 
explains that high transaction costs lead to more home bias, while the information cost explains 
that the higher expenditure of information acquisition leads to higher foreign equity holdings. 
The coefficients of total numbers of different holdings of the funds ( iTtlhold ) are significantly 
and negatively related to the foreign equity holdings. The reason may be that the larger total 
number of holdings implies that the assets are more diversified within domestic countries, and 
thus there is less need to hold foreign assets. As expected, the coefficients for iNumFunds are 
significantly negative, which implies that the more funds a manager is in charge of, the less that 
are foreign assets holdings. Both Herfindal Indexes are significantly and negatively associated 
with the foreign assets, which are consistent with our expectation. The results for the dummy 
Closeend indicate that foreign equity holdings are indifferent between open-end funds and close-
ended funds. The coefficients for manager Tenure are not consistent with the expectations and 
are not significant. This may be due to the fact that the model was tested with the whole sample 
and the tenures for management teams are not meaningful. The further subgroup analysis is 
conducted as following.  
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To test the robustness of size effect on foreign asset holdings, different groups of 
managers were further examined. First, the management team is a large group where the 
members cannot be identified. Therefore the assets allocated to management teams are large and 
may reflect false size effect. Table 3 reports the results for the subgroup sample of single 
managers only. As shown in Table 3, the results are similar to Table 2 in that the proportions of 
foreign equity holdings are significantly increasing with the size of assets allocated to the 
portfolio managers. There is some evidence that management tenure is significantly and 
positively related with foreign equity holdings at 5% in column (2). 
(Table 3 about here) 
Second, some portfolio managers can easily choose to acquire information about a subset 
of foreign assets either by focusing on the asset class or by focusing on specific countries. 
Therefore, we specifically examined domestic equity funds as a single group in Table 4 and 
domestic equity funds with single manager in Table 5. Not surprisingly, the summarized 
statistics for the domestic equity funds indicate that the average foreign asset holdings are only 
6.34% (86.51% at domestic asset, 4.51 % at bonds and 2.64% at cash). Similarly, the regression 
results at both Table 4 and Table 5 show that, controlling all other effects, the foreign equity 
shares are significantly increasing with the size of the portfolio.  
(Tables 4 and 5 about here) 
4. Conclusion 
 This paper investigates the different degrees of home bias across the portfolio managers.  
The theoretical discussion based on Barron and Ni (2006) captures the cause of the informational 
differences across the domestic portfolio managers by introducing the information acquisition 
process. This distinguishes the paper from the rest of the literature in that it demonstrates a direct 
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link between the information cost and home bias. Given the constant information cost, the model 
predicts that there exists a proportion of uninformed portfolio managers in the domestic country 
because they have relatively high information cost per unit of asset investment. Furthermore, the 
model provides testable hypotheses that the portfolio managers with a relatively low information 
cost ratio will be less home biased.   
The paper finds that mutual fund managers (especially domestic equity fund managers) 
reveal home biases, which are consistent with the observations for other groups in previous 
literature such as Chan et al. (2005). Most importantly, the regression results show that foreign 
asset holdings are positively and significantly associated with the portfolio sizes of the managers, 
which is consistent with the theoretical model. This conclusion is robust among the subgroups 
(whole sample, single manager group, domestic equity fund group, and domestic equity fund 
with single manager) after controlling the other variables such as fund concentration, manager 
tenures, total number of holdings, fund categories and objectives,  number of funds, expense 
ratios, dummies for team management, and dummies for close-ended funds.  
In future empirical research, one avenue is to investigate how principle-agent problems 
affect the extent of the home bias across institutional investors. As the referee pointed out, the 
larger the fund, the less likely the manager is to take risk because it increases the likelihood of 
losing his/her position. One conjecture is that the home bias may be aggravated by this 
conservative strategy. Correspondingly, the numbers of independent directors affect both future 
fund performance and the likelihood of underperforming manager replacement (Ding and 
Wermers, 2005), it will be interesting to see how governance structure affects the home bias. 
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Footnotes 
1 The other previous explanation to the equity home bias includes the hedging theory 
(Lewis 1999) that was not supported by empirical evidence (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Eldor, 
Pines and Schwartz, 1988; Stockman and Dellas, 1987; Baxter and Jermann, 1997; Jacquillat and 
Solnik, 1978; Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994), and international tax and transaction cost barriers 
in international capital markets (Black, 1974; Stulz 1981a, 1981b). The empirical tests found that 
international taxes and government restrictions can affect the equity home bias among developed 
countries (Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal and Wheatley, 1990; Hardouvelis, La Porta and Wizman, 
1994; Claessens and Rhee, 1994; Errunza and Losq, 1985), but not for less developed countries 
(Lewis 1995, 1999).   Tesar and Werner (1995) argue that transaction cost cannot explain the 
home bias based on the high turnover rate of foreign assets. However, recent works reinforce the 
role of transaction cost on home bias and it can coexist with the high turnover rate (Rowland, 
1999; Amadi and Bergin, 2006). 
2 Some related studies find that home bias phenomena exist not only internationally but 
also regionally (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). 
3 Their further examinations indicate that more can be explained by behavioral 
determinants. Also see Strong and Xu (2003) for a behavioral explanation.   
4 Karlsson and Norden (2007) find that in Sweden the likelihood of home bias increases 
on smaller wealth, higher ages and less experienced persons. Graham et al. (2005) find that the 
share of home investments for a sample of US investors is positively related to lower income, 
higher age, less education, and being female. 
25 
 
5 The most popular alternative was future compensation based on piecewise linear (and 
concave) functions of the future value of the managed assets.  Bagnoli and Watts (2000) noted 
that these compensation forms reflect Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations 
for fund manager compensation, and in particular, the Investment Company Amendments Act of 
1970, amended section 205. 
6 In the rational expectation model setting, a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
utility function for the portfolio manager allows for an explicit demand function solution.  
Assuming the special inverse function of initial portfolio size simplifies calculations for the 
market clear condition.   
7 This follows as managers of a fund have identical preferences and compensation 
package, and thus will agree on the optimal portfolio that maximizes the expected utility derived 
from compensation. 
8 The proof is available upon request.  
9 2004 Morningstar, Inc.  
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Table 1: Summarized Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Asset Allocation       
as % of domestic assets 11761 72.57 35.48 0.00 100.00 
as % of foreign assets 11761 19.51 32.12 0.00 100.00 
as %  of bonds 11761 5.04 14.12 0.00 98.94 
as % of  other 11761 2.89 11.80 0.00 100.00 
Total 11761 100.0    
as % of Assets at developed Countries 11579 97.43 9.36 0.00 100.00 
as % of Assets at emerging Countries  11579 2.54 9.32 0.00 100.00 
Total 11761 100.0    
Size (Unit: Million dollars) 12159 79,527.06 150,559.50 0.00 383,977.20 
Expense Ratio 10967 1.54 0.71 0.00 10.00 
Front Load Fee 12159 1.07 2.13 0.00 8.50 
Deferred Load Fee 12159 0.92 1.72 0.00 6.00 
Average Total Number of Holdings 11811 169.54 299.54 1.00 6211.00 
Manage Tenure 9745 4.68 3.88 0.00 46.50 
Average Number of Funds 12159 433.51 878.90 1.00 2268.00 
HI1 11579 0.97 0.08 0.50 1.00 
HI2 11761 0.83 0.19 0.28 1.00 
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Table 2: Effect of Portfolio Size on  Foreign Equity Holdings (Whole Sample) 
(Dependent Variable: Percentage of Foreign Assets) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Asset Size 0.431 0.329 0.456 0.372 
 (0.053)*** (0.056)*** (0.065)*** (0.067)*** 
Expense -0.016 0.113 0.065 0.118 
 (0.096) (0.101) (0.067) (0.068)* 
Log of Total Number of Holdings -0.957 -0.795 -0.858 -0.789 
 (0.098)*** (0.100)*** (0.123)*** (0.123)*** 
Manager Tenure 0.001 0.019 -0.029 -0.013 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) 
Number of Funds -0.053 -0.041 -0.069 -0.059 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)*** 
Dummy for Team Management (=1) 9.724 9.685 11.722 12.134 
 (2.206)*** (2.316)*** (2.682)*** (2.750)*** 
Dummy for Multiple Managers  (=2) -0.313 -0.311 -0.544 -0.512 
 (0.181)* (0.189)* (0.222)** (0.226)** 
Dummy for Close-ended Funds  (=1) -0.312 -0.306 -0.256 -0.334 
 (0.412) (0.430) (0.508) (0.519) 
HI1 -50.977  -46.825  
 (1.684)***  (2.055)***  
HI2  -23.067  -21.107 
  (0.796)***  (0.950)*** 
Constant 56.578 26.584 51.975 24.444 
 (1.813)*** (1.054)*** (2.231)*** (1.306)*** 
Observations 8688 8813 9187 9312 
Adjusted R-squared 0.94 0.93 0.89 0.89 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: Fund category and objective dummies are included in the regression but not reported for 
space efficiency. 
 
  
28 
Table 3: Effect of Portfolio Size on  Foreign Equity Holdings (Single Manager Group) 
(Dependent Variable: Percentage of Foreign Assets) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Asset Size 0.439 0.377 0.470 0.426 
 (0.076)*** (0.085)*** (0.103)*** (0.108)*** 
Expense -0.203 0.157 0.075 0.313 
 (0.135) (0.150) (0.108) (0.113)*** 
Log of Total Number of Holdings -1.442 -0.861 -1.039 -0.605 
 (0.147)*** (0.161)*** (0.205)*** (0.211)*** 
Manager Tenure 0.004 0.068 -0.031 0.032 
 (0.030) (0.034)** (0.042) (0.044) 
Number of Funds -0.062 -0.051 -0.071 -0.063 
 (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** 
Dummy for Close-ended Funds 
(=1) 0.484 0.590 0.541 0.780 
 (0.634) (0.711) (0.870) (0.914) 
HI1 -48.313  -47.660  
 (2.272)***  (3.076)***  
HI2  -23.576  -21.707 
  (1.185)***  (1.502)*** 
Constant 56.667 27.433 53.293 23.046 
 (2.430)*** (1.554)*** (3.329)*** (2.049)*** 
Observations 3968 4044 4209 4285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.94 0.92 0.87 0.85 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: Fund category and objective dummies are included in the regression but not reported for 
space efficiency. 
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Table 4: Effect of Portfolio Size on  Foreign Equity Holdings (Domestic Manager Group) 
(Dependent Variable: Percentage of Foreign Assets) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Asset Size 0.545 0.121 0.557 0.176 
 (0.043)*** (0.034)*** (0.041)*** (0.033)*** 
Expense -0.027 -0.013 -0.026 -0.020 
 (0.078) (0.060) (0.042) (0.034) 
Log of Total Number of Holdings -0.736 -0.317 -0.718 -0.409 
 (0.080)*** (0.060)*** (0.078)*** (0.061)*** 
Manager Tenure 0.002 0.034 -0.003 0.032 
 (0.019) (0.015)** (0.018) (0.014)** 
Number of Funds -0.048 -0.016 -0.049 -0.021 
 (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** 
Dummy for Team Management (=1) 7.759 7.242 4.066 3.793 
 (1.853)*** (1.438)*** (1.762)** (1.418)*** 
Dummy for Multiple Managers (=2) 0.026 -0.457 -0.233 -0.499 
 (0.149) (0.115)*** (0.142) (0.114)*** 
Dummy for Close-ended Funds (=1) -0.103 -0.381 0.218 -0.242 
 (0.334) (0.258) (0.319) (0.256) 
HI1 -124.530  -110.285  
 (2.376)***  (2.278)***  
HI2  -48.251  -43.455 
  (0.492)***  (0.484)*** 
Constant 127.507 49.149 113.307 44.730 
 (2.390)*** (0.628)*** (2.294)*** (0.640)*** 
Observations 7147 7260 7598 7711 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.67 0.42 0.62 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: Fund category and objective dummies are included in the regression but not reported for 
space efficiency. 
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Table 5: Effect of Portfolio Size on  Foreign Equity Holdings (Domestic Single Manager 
Group) 
(Dependent Variable: Percentage of Foreign Assets) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Asset Size 0.492 0.092 0.492 0.145 
 (0.064)*** (0.051)* (0.061)*** (0.050)*** 
Expense -0.096 0.027 -0.099 0.027 
 (0.115) (0.089) (0.066) (0.054) 
Log of Total Number of Holdings -1.338 -0.354 -1.325 -0.527 
 (0.125)*** (0.096)*** (0.122)*** (0.098)*** 
Manager Tenure -0.002 0.106 -0.017 0.087 
 (0.026) (0.021)*** (0.025) (0.021)*** 
Number of Funds -0.050 -0.022 -0.044 -0.020 
 (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)*** 
Dummy for Close-ended Funds 
(=1) 0.484 -0.437 0.636 -0.026 
 (0.541) (0.424) (0.520) (0.424) 
HI1 -114.880  -99.522  
 (3.004)***  (2.918)***  
HI2  -50.037  -43.838 
  (0.735)***  (0.723)*** 
Constant 120.912 50.600 105.890 45.249 
 (3.031)*** (0.915)*** (2.952)*** (0.938)*** 
Observations 3329 3393 3543 3607 
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.69 0.45 0.63 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: Fund category and objective dummies are included in the regression but not reported for 
space efficiency. 
 
 
